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Abstract 
This paper uses a small-open economy model for the Canadian economy to examine the 
optimal Taylor-type monetary policy rule that stabilizes output and inflation in an 
environment where endogenous boom-bust cycles in house prices can occur. The model 
shows that boom-bust cycles in house prices emerge when credit-constrained mortgage 
borrowers expect that future house prices will rise and this expectation is neither shared 
by savers nor realized ex-post. These boom-bust cycles replicate the stylized features of 
housing-market boom-bust cycles in industrialized countries. In an environment where 
mortgage borrowers are occasionally over-optimistic, the central bank should be less 
responsive to inflation, more responsive to output, and slower to adjust the nominal 
policy interest rate. This optimal monetary policy rule dampens endogenous boom-bust 
cycles in house prices, but prolongs inflation target horizons due to weak policy reactions 
to inflation fluctuations after fundamental shocks. 
JEL classification: E44, E52 
Bank classification: Credit and credit aggregates; Financial stability; Inflation targets 
Résumé 
Dans le cadre d’un modèle de petite économie ouverte se prêtant à l’étude de l’économie 
canadienne, l’auteur examine la règle de Taylor optimale qui permet de stabiliser la 
production et l’inflation en présence de cycles endogènes d’envolée et d’effondrement 
des prix de l’immobilier résidentiel. Le modèle montre que de tels cycles peuvent 
émerger si les emprunteurs hypothécaires ayant un accès limité au crédit s’attendent à 
une hausse des prix des maisons mais que ces attentes ne sont pas partagées par les 
épargnants et sont déçues par la suite. Ces cycles d’envolée et d’effondrement sont 
conformes, dans les grandes lignes, aux cycles d’essor et de contraction du marché du 
logement dans les pays industrialisés. Lorsque les emprunteurs hypothécaires sont à 
l’occasion exagérément optimistes, la banque centrale devrait réagir moins aux variations 
de l’inflation et davantage à celles de la production, et modifier moins rapidement le taux 
d’intérêt directeur nominal. Cette règle de politique monétaire optimale atténue les cycles 
endogènes d’envolée et d’effondrement des prix des maisons, mais elle a pour effet 
d’allonger l’horizon nécessaire pour ramener l’inflation au taux visé, puisque la politique 
monétaire réagit faiblement aux fluctuations de l’inflation après un choc fondamental. 
Classification JEL : E44, E52 
Classification de la Banque : Crédit et agrégats du crédit; Stabilité financière; Cibles en 
matière d’inflation 1 Introduction
Strong asset-price booms have tended to end with signiﬁcant drops in asset prices, leading to
severe economic contractions that call for monetary policy responses. Thus, monetary policy
reactions to boom-bust cycles in asset prices have become an important policy question for
central banks.
In the literature, Bernanke and Gertler (1999) examine the performance of the Taylor-
type monetary policy rule during boom-bust cycles in the price of capital, using the Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) model. They assume that boom-bust cycles are caused by
exogenous deviations of the market price of capital from the ‘fundamental’ price implied
by the capital market’s competitive equilibrium. They ﬁnd that a strong commitment to
stabilizing expected inﬂation is eﬀective in stabilizing current inﬂation and output in this
environment. Following their ﬁnding, Basant Roi and Mendes (2007) examine the optimal
Taylor rule that stabilizes the volatility of output and inﬂation during a similar type of
exogenous boom-bust cycle in house prices in a small-open economy model for the Canadian
economy. They particularly focus on optimal target horizons for inﬂation under the optimal
Taylor rule (the expected numbers of periods which the inﬂation rate takes to return to the
target after shocks under the optimal Taylor rule).1 They ﬁnd that exogenous house price
shocks that cause boom-bust cycles lead to persistent inﬂation dynamics, prolonging the
optimal target horizons.
This paper contributes to this literature by conducting optimal monetary policy analysis
during boom-bust cycles in house prices, including evaluation of optimal target horizons,
using a small-open economy model for the Canadian economy developed by Tomura (2009a).
This model improves the exogenous boom-bust models in the literature described above in
two dimensions. First, boom-bust cycles in house prices occur endogenously due to over-
optimistic expectations of households. This innovation is important for policy analysis, since
policy evaluation using exogenous boom-bust models must ignore the feedback eﬀect from
monetary policy to boom-bust cycles in asset prices and the consequent spillover eﬀect to
the rest of the economy. Second, the model endogenously replicates the stylized features of
1The deﬁnition of optimal target horizons is adopted from Batini and Nelson (2000).
2macroeconomic dynamics during boom-bust cycles in house prices observed in industrialized
countries. Thus, optimal monetary policy analysis in this paper is built upon one of the
possible mechanisms for boom-bust cycles in house prices in reality.
In the model, there are two types of households: borrowers, who take mortgage loans,
and savers, who provide mortgage loans. There exist credit constraints such that households
can borrow only up to the collateral value of their housing.2 Households receive noisy public
signals of future fundamentals, which may not be realized ex-post. This assumption follows
the so-called “news-shock” literature, which analyzes expectation-driven boom-bust cycles
in business cycle models.3 While the preceding models in the news-shock literature assume
that households share identical expectations, the model in this paper relaxes this assumption,
allowing households to have heterogeneous prior beliefs on the precision of public signals,
which generate heterogeneous expectations among households observing the same public
signal.
The model shows that endogenous boom-bust cycles in house prices emerge when credit-
constrained borrowers expect that future house prices will rise and this expectation is not
shared by savers or realized ex-post. This result is consistent with suggestive evidence on
the relationship between heterogeneous expectations and boom-bust cycles in house prices.
Borrowers and savers in the model can be interpreted as young and old households, respec-
tively, since mortgage borrowers tend to be young and the holders of positive net ﬁnancial
assets tend to be old. As will be described in Section 3, Tomura (2009a) ﬁnds that real house
price growth has tended to be higher when young households showed stronger consumer con-
ﬁdence on future economic conditions than old households in household survey data in U.S.
and Canada.
As summarized in Section 2, cross-country data for industrialized countries indicate that
2Except for heterogeneous beliefs, the features of the model follow Iacoviello (2005).
3In the literature, it has been found diﬃcult to generate expectation-driven boom-bust cycles in output
and asset prices by overly optimistic household expectations in standard business cycle models. The literature
has been focusing on ﬁnding a set-up with which overly optimistic household expectations cause boom-bust
cycles. For example, Beaudry and Portier (2004) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) modify the production
function and the household-utility function, respectively. Christiano, et al. (2007) introduce nominal wage
rigidity and an inﬂation-targeting central bank represented by a Taylor rule.
3the nominal policy interest rate and the CPI inﬂation rate have tended to decline during
housing booms and rise after the peaks of housing booms. The model explains this obser-
vation as follows. When borrowers expect that future house prices will rise, they increase
housing investments, which causes a housing boom. Since borrowers are credit-constrained,
they work more to ﬁnance their housing investments during the boom. At the same time,
when savers do not share the optimistic expectations of borrowers, they instead expect the
boom to be temporary and increase savings for a future recession. The increases in labour
supply and savings reduce real wages and the real interest rate, respectively. Given sticky
prices, a resulting fall in the marginal cost of production lowers the inﬂation rate, and, in
response to this, the central bank cuts the policy rate. When the optimistic expectations
of borrowers are not realized ex-post, a housing bust occurs, and savings and labour supply
decline. As a consequence, the inﬂation rate rises, inducing a monetary policy tightening.
This paper ﬁnds that taking into account the stylized facts of housing-market boom-bust
cycles is very important for optimal monetary policy analysis. Since inﬂation is counter-
cyclical during boom-bust cycles in house prices, strong monetary policy reactions to inﬂation
ﬂuctuations would amplify boom-bust cycles by enhancing the counter-cyclical movement of
the nominal policy interest rate, which destabilizes aggregate economic activity, including
output. Thus, the optimal Taylor rule in the model implies that the central bank should
be less responsive to inﬂation, more responsive to output, and slower to adjust the nominal
policy interest rate. This monetary policy rule prolongs optimal inﬂation target horizons
due to weak policy reactions to inﬂation ﬂuctuations after fundamental shocks.
The optimal Taylor rule in this model contrasts with the implication of exogenous boom-
bust models. As demonstrated by Bernanke and Gertler (1999), exogenous asset-price shocks
that cause boom-bust cycles in exogenous boom-bust models generate positive co-movement
between output and inﬂation, which do not replicate the stylized fact of the negative cor-
relation between output and inﬂation during boom-bust cycles. This feature of exogenous
boom-bust models lead to the conclusion that a monetary policy commitment to stabilizing
inﬂation also stabilizes output during boom-bust cycles in asset prices.
On the other hand, the results of this paper and Basant Roi and Mendes (2007) jointly
imply that optimal inﬂation target horizons are longer during boom-bust cycles in house
4prices, whether they are exogenous or endogenous. The diﬀerence between the two papers
is in the cause of the longer target horizons. In Basant Roi and Mendes’ model, exogenous
house-price shocks cause persistent inﬂation dynamics directly. In this paper, the adjustment
of the optimal monetary policy rule to boom-bust cycles in house prices prolongs inﬂation
dynamics in response to fundamental shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the stylized features
of housing-market boom-bust cycles in industrialized countries. Section 3 shows suggestive
evidence for the relationship between heterogeneous expectations and house prices. Section 4
describes the model. Section 5 shows that endogenous boom-bust cycles in house prices in the
model replicate the stylized features of housing-market boom-bust cycles in industrialized
countries. Section 6 examines the optimal Taylor rule. Section 7 shows optimal target
horizons implied by the optimal Taylor rule. Section 8 conducts sensitivity analysis. Section
9 concludes.
2 The stylized features of housing-market boom-bust
cycles
Ahearne, et al. (2005) summarize the stylized features of boom-bust cycles in house prices
by pooling the time-series of macroeconomic indicators over a 5-year window around the
peaks of housing booms in industrialized countries. Taking the median of each indicator in
each period in the time window, they ﬁnd that output, consumption and investment have
tended to positively co-move with house prices during boom-bust cycles, while the nominal
policy interest rate and the CPI inﬂation rate have tended to decline during housing booms
and rise as house prices fell.
Figure 1 reproduces the charts 3.1-3 reported by Ahearne, et al. for the real GDP
growth rate, the CPI inﬂation rate, and the nominal policy interest rate, following their data
appendix. The panels in the ﬁgure are not completely identical with their charts, since for
the nominal policy interest rate and the CPI inﬂation rate, I take the medians of changes in
these variables from the beginning of the time window (5 years before the peaks of housing
5booms), while Ahearne, et al. show the medians of the levels of these variables.4 Also,
for the CPI inﬂation rate, Ahearne, et al. use the rates targeted by central banks if exist,
while I use total CPI inﬂation rates consistently. Moreover, I add the rate of growth of total
hours worked to Figure 1, which shows that total hours worked have tended to grow strongly
during housing booms and decline signiﬁcantly during housing busts. See the data appendix
of Tomura (2009a) for the construction of Figure 1. Tomura (2009a) also shows that these
stylized facts held largely during the housing booms in Canada around 1981 and 1989.
3 Suggestive evidence on the eﬀects of heterogeneous
expectations on house prices
The model in this paper will indicate that house prices rise with over-optimistic expectations
of mortgage borrowers compared to savers and that the labour supply of mortgage borrowers
is pro-cyclical during housing-market boom-bust cycles. This section describes two empirical
observations consistent with the model: the average hours worked of young workers co-
move with house prices more closely than those of old workers do in Canada; and the real
house price growth rate tends to be higher when young households show stronger consumer
conﬁdence on future economic conditions than old households in U.S. and Canada. This
section compares behaviour of diﬀerent age groups, since mortgage borrowers tend to be
young and the holders of positive net ﬁnancial assets tend to be old.
3.1 Positive correlations between house prices and the average
hours worked of young households
Figure 2 compares the real house price index and the average hours worked of young and
old households in Canada. It shows that the average hours worked of young households (less
than 45 years old) rose and fell with housing booms and busts, respectively, around 1980 and
4Note that the levels of nominal variables tend to be non-stationary and vary across countries. Considering
changes in the nominal variables rather than the levels alleviates this problem when pooling data across
countries and time.
61990, while the average hours worked of old households (45-65 years old, and 45 years old and
over) did not show such a clear correlation with house prices in those periods. The average
hours worked in the ﬁgure are hours worked per population per week for each age group,
which include both intensive and extensive margins. Tomura (2009a) show the correlation
coeﬃcient between detrended real house prices and detrended average hours worked is higher
for the young than the old.
3.2 Positive response of the real house price growth rate to over-
optimistic expectations of young households
This section examines the responses of house prices to the diﬀerences in expectations between
young and old households. For a proxy to household expectations, I construct an index of
household expectations of future economic conditions from a subset of the survey data from
the Conference Board of Canada that are used for constructing the Index of Consumer Con-
ﬁdence. More speciﬁcally, there are two questions about future economic conditions among
the four overall survey questions:
• considering everything, do you think that your family will be better oﬀ, the same
or worse oﬀ ﬁnancially six months from now?
• how do you feel the job situation and overall employment will be in this community
six months from now?
Following the methodology for constructing the Index of Consumer Conﬁdence, I derive an
index of household expectations by adding the percentage of positive responses and subtract-
ing the percentage of negative responses for each question. Thus, higher values of the index
indicate more optimistic views of households for the future. I measure the over-optimistic
expectations of young households compared to old households by the diﬀerence of the index
for young households (less than 45 years old) from the index for old households (45 years old
and over), and regress the real house price growth rate on this diﬀerence as well as lagged
dependent variables, the average index of household expectations for all ages, the real GDP
growth rate and the real interest rate. I estimate the coeﬃcients by OLS, assuming that
unobserved house price shocks are orthogonal to the diﬀerence in the index of household
expectations. Due to availability of the survey data for age groups, the sample period is for
71990:4-2007:1.
Table 1 shows the regression results. There are three regressions with diﬀerent sets of
regressors. In each regression, the lag-2 regressor of the diﬀerence in the index of household
expectations between the young and the old shows a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
the real house price growth rate. Even though the contemporaneous diﬀerence in the index
of household expectations has negative coeﬃcients in Regressions 1 and 2, the coeﬃcient
becomes insigniﬁcant when I consider the full set of regressors in Regression 3, adding the
average index of household expectations for all ages.
Note that the household expectation survey data for age groups in Canada are available
only for the recent period after 1990, so that the sample period for the regressions has to be
short. Also the horizon of the questions is 6 month, which is short, too. These properties
of the regressions may aﬀect the regression results. To circumvent these problems, I look at
U.S. data in addition. In U.S., the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers provide the
Index of Consumer Expectations for age groups from 1978. The horizons of the questions
that the Index is based on are 1 and 5 years, depending on each question. Figure 3 compares
the real house price growth rate and the diﬀerence of the Index of Consumer Expectations
for young households (less than 45 years old) from that for old households (45 years old or
more) in U.S. The ﬁgure shows that the two series have co-moved very closely, especially
until the late 1990s. Tomura (2009b) reports that in fact the contemporaneous diﬀerence in
the Index of Consumer Expectations between the young and the old has robustly signiﬁcant
positive eﬀects on the real house price growth rate in regressions similar to those considered
in Table 1.
4 Model
This section describes a small open economy model for the Canadian economy developed
by Tomura (2009a). The model includes two types of households who take and provide
mortgage loans as well as collateral constraints on residential mortgages as in Iacoviello
(2005). The model also incorporates monopolistic ﬁrms that produce intermediate inputs, a
representative ﬁrm that produces ﬁnal goods competitively, and a monetary authority.
84.1 Production
Final good production. There is a representative ﬁrm that acts in a perfectly compet-
itive market and uses composite domestic and imported inputs to produce ﬁnal goods, yt,
























for i = D,M. (2)
Domestic inputs are denoted by D, and imported inputs are denoted by M. The parameter
ω > 0 denotes the share for imported inputs in the production of ﬁnal goods, and θ > 0 is
the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent intermediate inputs.







for i = D,M. The cost minimization for the ﬁnal-good ﬁrm entails the following demand
































Final goods can be consumed, invested into capital or exported abroad.
9Intermediate inputs. There is a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by j ∈ [0,1] that monop-
olistically produce yD,t(j) units of each variety of domestic intermediate input according to




where kt(j) is the amount of capital, lt(j) is the units of labour and α ∈ (0,1) is the constant
share for capital in production. At denotes labour augmenting technology. The monopolistic
ﬁrms can only infrequently adjust the prices of their products with probability 1 − χ every
period. When adjusting the price, each ﬁrm maximizes the present discounted value of
















subject to the demand function (3). E′
t is the subjective conditional expectation operator
for ﬁrms and Λt,s is the ﬁrms’ discount factor between periods t and s. The expectation
operator and the discount factor are identical to those of the share holders of ﬁrms that will



















which is the marginal cost of production for domestic inputs implied by competitive factor
markets and the production function (8).
Each variety of imported inputs is supplied to the domestic market by a monopolistic
importing ﬁrm. Importers buy homogeneous foreign goods at a unit cost of etP ∗
t for a
given nominal exchange rate, et, and foreign price level, P ∗
t . Thus the real exchange rate,
st, becomes the real acquisition price of imported goods. Importers produce each variety
of imported intermediate inputs, yM,t(j), from homogeneous foreign goods via one-to-one
transformation. Each monopolistic importer sets the price PM,t(j) of each variety of imported
input for j ∈ [0,1]. As in the domestic intermediate inputs sector, each importer faces a




















subject to the demand function (3).
4.2 Households
Consider two types of households that diﬀer in terms of the subjective discount factor:
one type of household has a higher time-discount rate than the other. Following Iacoviello
(2005), characterize the former type as ‘patient’, and the latter type as ‘impatient’. The two
types of households are of mass   ∈ (0,1) and 1 −  , respectively. As described below, the
heterogeneity in time discount rates implies that patient households provide mortgage loans
to impatient households in the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady state.
Patient Households. Each patient household, denoted by (′), derives utility from
consumption, c′
t, and housing services provided by the housing stock, h′
t, and disutility from
supplying labour, l′





















t is the subjective conditional expectation operator for patient households, β′ is the
time-discount rate, and γ, η, ξ′ > 0. Patient households control the domestic-input ﬁrms
and the importers as share holders. Hence assume Λt,s = (β′s−tc′
t/c′
s) and that the domestic-
input ﬁrms, the importers and patient households share the identical subjective conditional
expectation operator, E′
t. These assumptions ensure that the domestic-input ﬁrms and the
importers behave as if they maximize the utility function of patient households.





































t−1 + (1 + rD,t−1)b
′
D,t−1 + Γt, (14)
where i′
t is investment in capital stock, k′




t−1 is the change in housing stock, b′
F,t is foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency,
11b′
D,t is the supply of mortgage loans to impatient households, qt is the real price of housing
stock, st is the real exchange rate, rF,t is the real world interest rate, wt is the real wage, rk,t
is the real rental price of capital stock, rD,t is the domestic real interest rate, and Γt is the
sum of the proﬁts from the monopolistic domestic-input producers and importers.5
The real interest rate is determined by the ratio between the gross nominal interest rate,
Rt, controlled by the monetary authority and patient households’ expected gross inﬂation
rate of ﬁnal goods:





where Πt is the gross inﬂation rate of ﬁnal goods, that is, Pt/Pt−1. While bonds are indexed
in the baseline model, Section 8 will introduce nominal bonds to conﬁrm the robustness of
the results of the model.
The fourth term on the left-hand side of (14) is an adjustment cost on foreign bond
holdings, (ζB/2)(b′
F,t)2, where ζB > 0, which ensures that dynamics around the steady state
are stationary in the equilibrium analysis presented below.6 The ﬁfth term on the left-hand
side is an adjustment cost on the installation of capital. In the equilibrium analysis below,
the existence of capital adjustment cost will generate co-movement between consumption
and investment.










































5Note that money balance does not appear either in the utility function or in the budget constraint. This
is equivalent to considering a ‘cashless’ economy where real money balance enters the utility function in an
additive term every period but the real and nominal money balances are so inﬁnitesimal that they do not
aﬀect the budget constraint.
6See, e.g., Schmitt-Groh` e and Uribe (2003) for further details.
7The budget constraint (17) implies that impatient households do not invest in capital. It can be shown
that their impatience implies no capital holding in the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady state.
12As in Iacoviello (2005), the collateral constraint (18) implies that impatient households can
only borrow up to the collateral value of their housing.8 Since impatient households value
current consumption more than patient households, it is possible to show that impatient
households borrow up to the limit in the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady state.9
The collateral value of housing is determined by the expectations of lenders, who are patient
households in the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady state, and the parameter m
representing the maximum loan-to-value ratio for residential mortgages.
Note that the elasticity of labour supply can be diﬀerent between the patient and the
impatient households. This assumption is consistent with the fact that mortgage borrowers
tend to be young and the holders of positive net ﬁnancial assets tend to be old and that the
volatility of labour supply is higher for young workers than old workers.
4.3 Monetary policy
Assume that the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule in the following form:
b Rt = φR b Rt−1 + φπ\ dCPIt + φY \ GDPt + ψt, (19)
where φR is a smoothing-term parameter, φπ and φY determine the responses of the nominal
policy interest rate to CPI inﬂation and real GDP, respectively, and ψt is an i.i.d. monetary
policy shock. The variables denoted by the hat symbol “b” are the log deviations from the
steady state values. This type of monetary policy rule is standard in the literature. For
sensitivity analysis, Section 8 will consider a case where the nominal policy interest rate
responds to the expected inﬂation rate instead of the current inﬂation rate.
On the right-hand side of (19), GDPt denotes real GDP and dCPIt denotes the CPI
inﬂation rate. Real GDP is the value of domestic production, which equals PD,tyD,t/Pt.
The deﬁnition of the CPI inﬂation rate reﬂects the treatment of housing rental cost in the
8See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) for the bargaining environment behind the collateral constraint. I assume
that borrowers can renegotiate debt contracts only before the realization of aggregate shocks in the next
period, so that lenders can seize borrowers’ labour income in period t +1 if their debts exceed the values of
the collateral after the realization of shocks.
9See Iacoviello (2005) for more details.
13Canadian statistics, such that:
dCPIt =










(1 − λ) + λ
rh,t
rh,SS




where Pt is the nominal price of ﬁnal goods, λ is the ﬁxed weight on the housing-rent
components of the CPI, and rh,t is the real value of the housing-rent components of the CPI.
The subscript SS denotes steady state values. Use the steady-state values for the base-year
values of the price indices for housing rent and ﬁnal goods. The treatment of rental costs in
the CPI has the potential to be important for optimal policy since they allow house prices
to aﬀect the measure of inﬂation directly.
The model does not incorporate renters formally. Assume the following reduced-form
speciﬁcations for rh,t:
b rh,t = κb qt. (21)
Tomura (2009a) conducts sensitivity analysis and ﬁnds that the main feature of the model
does not change even with an alternative speciﬁcation that the housing-rent components
are correlated with the user cost of housing for patient households (i.e., b rh,t = κb ut where
ut = qt − E′
tΠt+1qt+1/Rt).
4.4 Market-clearing conditions
In each period, the following market clearing conditions are satisﬁed for labour, capital stock,
housing stock and mortgage loans, respectively:
 l
′














t + (1 −  )h
′′
t = 1, (24)
 b
′
t + (1 −  )b
′′
t = 0. (25)
The ﬁxed supply of housing stock (i.e. land) is normalized to 1. Note that lt(j) and kt(j)
are labour and capital demand, respectively, by the domestic-input ﬁrm of variety j. The
14second equation implies that the capital stock available for production in the current period
must be formed in the previous period. Factor demand, {kt(j),lt(j)}j∈[0,1], is determined by






(1 − α)ft yt(j)
wt
. (27)
4.5 Balance of payments
The trade balance must equal the economy-wide net saving, so that:













where τ > 0 is the elasticity of the home country’s aggregate exports and YF,t is an export
demand shock summarizing business conditions in the rest of the world. As a rise in st
implies depreciation, the positive value of τ ensures that export demand rises as the home
currency depreciates.
4.6 Shock processes, public signals and heterogeneous expecta-
tions
Assume that labour augmenting technology, At, the world interest rate, rF,t, the export
demand shock, YF,t, and the monetary policy shock, ψt, follow AR(1) processes. I denote
the deterministic steady-state values of rF,t and YF,t by rF and YF, respectively. Each shock
process is deﬁned by:
xt = ρxxt−1 + εx,t, εx,t ∽ i.i.d. N(0,σ
2
εx), 0 < ρx < 1, (30)
for xt ∈ {ln(At), ln((1 + rF,t)/(1 + rF)), ln(YF,t/YF), ψt}.
15Households receive a public signal sA,t of a future technological shock εA,t+n. The signal
of the shock is generated by the following process:
sA,t = εA,t+n + ωA,t, (31)
where ωA,t is an uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and stan-
dard deviation ν2
A.
Assume that each type of household holds a time-invariant belief of the value of νA,




A, respectively.10 It can be shown that the subjective conditional















Thus, public signals generate heterogeneous expectations of future economic conditions
among households.
This assumption of time-invariant heterogeneous beliefs is related to a vast strand of the
behavioural ﬁnance literature that analyzes the joint behaviour of stock prices and trading
volume in the stock market. See Hong and Stein (2007) for a survey. This literature indicates
that heterogeneous expectations among investors generated by their heterogeneous beliefs
explain non-fundamental ﬂuctuations in stock prices accompanied by an increase in trading
volume. This paper investigates the eﬀects of heterogeneous beliefs among households on
house prices.
4.7 Equilibrium conditions












s=t solves the maximization
problem for impatient households, and Pi,t(j) for i = D,M and j ∈ [0,1] solves the maxi-
mization problem for the domestic-input ﬁrm or the importer if the price can be adjusted
10As described above, the domestic-input ﬁrms and the importers share the same beliefs with patient
households.
16in period t. Otherwise, Pi,t(j) equals Pi,t−1(j). {wt, rK,t, qt, ft, yt, Pt, Rt, Γt} is determined
to satisfy the market clearing conditions (22)-(25) and the balance of payments (28), given
the deﬁnition of each variable speciﬁed above. Households hold rational expectations of the
determination of {ws, rK,s, qs, fs, ys, Ps, Rs, Γs}∞
s=t conditional on each realization of shocks
and public signals. However, households form the subjective likelihood of the realization of
future shocks on the basis of their time-invariant beliefs on the precision of public signals.
4.8 Solution method and parameter speciﬁcation
Equilibrium dynamics are solved by applying the undetermined coeﬃcient method to log-
linearized equilibrium conditions described above around the deterministic steady state. See
Tomura (2009b) for more details on the solution method.
Table 2 shows the baseline parameter values. The parameter values are calibrated with
aggregate Canadian data or adopted from standard values in the business cycle literature.
See Tomura (2009a) for details on parameter speciﬁcation and data sources.11 An important
feature of the parameter speciﬁcation is that the elasticity of labour supply of impatient
households is higher than that of patient households. I set this assumption by considering
that mortgage borrowers represented by impatient households tend to be young while the
owners of ﬁnancial assets represented by patient households tend to be old.12 Given this
interpretation, I calibrate the elasticities of labour supplies in the model to replicate the
volatility of average hours worked of young households and those of old households in Cana-
dian data, in which the average hours worked of young households show higher volatility than
those of old households. Table 3 compares the moments between the model and Canadian
data used in calibration.13 Also, I use an estimated Taylor rule coeﬃcients for the Canadian
economy in the monetary policy rule (19).
11Following Dib (2008), I assume the elasticity of substitution between varieties, θ, is identical between
domestic and imported intermediate inputs.
12See Meh and Terajima (2008) for the wealth distribution over age groups in Canada.
13Note that the model is calibrated to the moments of key variables for optimal monetary policy analysis,
i.e., the inﬂation rate and output, as well as average hours worked of diﬀerent age groups. Among the
moments of other variables, the model closely replicates the variances of the real exchange rate and the
current account, while aggregate consumption and investment in the model are more volatile than data.
175 Replication of the stylized features of housing-market
boom-bust cycles
Suppose that, in period 0, agents receive a public signal of technological progress that will
occur in 4 periods. The signal turns out to be wrong ex-post (i.e. sA,0 > 0 and ǫA,4 = 0).
I consider the case in which impatient households believe the public signal to be true (i.e.
ν′′
A = 0). In contrast, patient households do not believe the public signal to be true and
expect no future technological progress (i.e. ν
′
A = ∞).
Figure 4 shows that the equilibrium dynamics replicate the stylized pattern of housing-
market boom-bust cycles: real GDP and aggregate consumption, investment and labour
supply positively co-move with the house price; and the nominal policy interest rate and the
CPI inﬂation rate fall during housing booms and rise as the house price falls. The model
explains these stylized facts as follows. When impatient households expect that future house
prices will rise, they increase housing investments, which causes a housing boom. Since impa-
tient households are credit-constrained, they work more to ﬁnance their housing investments
during the boom. At the same time, when patient households do not share the optimistic
expectations of impatient households, they instead expect the boom to be temporary and
increase savings for a future recession. The increases in labour supply and savings reduce
real wages and the real interest rate, respectively. Given sticky prices, a resulting fall in the
marginal cost of production lowers the inﬂation rate, and, in response to this, the central
bank cuts the policy rate.14 When the impatient households’ expectations are not realized
in period 4, however, impatient households start dissaving the over-accumulated housing
stock. This weakens housing demand, which causes a housing bust. Impatient households
also reduce labour supply as they no longer have to raise funds for housing investments. At
the same time, patient households withdraw savings to support their consumption. This
development raises real wages and the real interest rate. As a consequence, the inﬂation rate
rises, inducing a monetary policy tightening.
Tomura (2009a) discusses the features of the model in more details. The paper ﬁnds
14This relationship between the real marginal cost of production and the inﬂation rate can be shown by
the new-Keynesian phillips curves implied by the Calvo-pricing.
18that the stylized features of housing-market boom-bust cycles arises in the model only if
impatient households become over-optimistic and the patient do not. For example, when
patient households believe an ex-post wrong signal of future technological progress, then
they increase consumption and reduce saving, which leads to a rise in the domestic real
interest rate. Having a rise in the cost of ﬁnancing, the impatient households reduce their
housing investments. Thus, they do not increase labour supply to raise funds for housing
investments, either. As a consequence, both the patient and the impatient households reduce
labour supply, and output falls in response to over-optimistic expectations of households. The
dynamics of the model becomes closer to this dynamics as the patient households put more
trust on signals, believing the signals are less noisy.
6 Evaluation of the optimal Taylor rule during endoge-
nous housing-market boom-bust cycles
This section evaluates the optimal Taylor rule during endogenous boom-bust cycles in house
prices. To introduce occasional endogenous boom-bust cycles in house prices into the model,
consider the following set-up. In addition to the set of the shocks to fundamentals described
above, households observe public signals of future technological progress. Assume that im-
patient households perceive that sA,t = ǫA,t+4 (i.e., ν′′
A = 0), and that patient households
believe that the signals are not informative (i.e., ν′
A = ∞). Assume that the true signal
process is a white noise, i.e., sA,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0,ν2
A). Thus, positive signals always generate
over-optimistic expectations of impatient households, and the impulse responses to positive
signals endogenously generate boom-bust cycles in house prices. This shocks can be inter-
preted as ‘housing-bubble’ shocks that make house prices deviate from their ‘fundamental’
prices endogenously.
Set the variance of the signal, νA, by considering the following scenario: once in 10 years
on average, borrowers become over-optimistic to the extent that house prices are pushed up
by more than 10% of the steady state value. More speciﬁcally, consider s such that ˆ qt = 0.1
at the peak of the impulse response to sA,0 = s, given the baseline parameter values in Table
192. Then set the value of νA with which the probability that sA,0 > s is 0.025.15
Here, I do not attempt to pin down the value of νA with Canadian data, since it is diﬃcult
to identify the fraction of house price movements contributed by over-optimistic expectations
of households. This question is left for future research. Instead, I consider a scenario of
realistic frequency and magnitude of boom-bust cycles, which is common among exogenous
boom-bust models in the literature.16 Later, Section 8 will show sensitivity analysis by
considering a smaller value of νA with which the probability that sA,0 > s is 0.025, where
ˆ qt = 0.05 at the peak of the impulse response to sA,0 = s. It will be shown that the results
of the analysis do not change signiﬁcantly.
The optimal Taylor rule is the coeﬃcients of the monetary policy rule:
b Rt = φR b Rt−1 + φπ\ dCPIt + φY \ GDPt + φqˆ qt (34)
that solve the stabilization problem of output-gap and inﬂation variances:
min E(\ dCPI
2
t) + E(\ GDPt
2
) + zE[(b Rt − b Rt−1)
2], (35)
where z ≥ 0. Note that the monetary policy rule (34) does not contain monetary policy
shocks. Thus, the optimal monetary policy analysis does not take into account any possibility
of policy error. Also, the monetary policy rule allows the central banks to directly respond
to house prices. The loss function (35) reﬂects the mandate for central banks to achieve
output and inﬂation stability. The last term of the loss function (35) is the averseness of
the central bank to ﬂuctuating the nominal policy interest rate. This type of loss function
is common in the literature on optimal monetary policy analysis.17 I consider z = 0 and
z = 0.5 to show that the results of the model do not depend on the inclusion of the third
term in the loss function. Section 8 will report that alternative weights in the loss function
do not change the results of the model.
Table 4 reports the optimal Taylor rules in two scenarios for each type of loss function.
In the ﬁrst scenario, “fundamental shocks only”, there is no signal or over-optimistic ex-
15νA = 2.436. Given the normal distribution of the signals, this number implies that the value of ˆ qt at
the peak of the impulse response to sA,0 is less than 0.15 with the probability of 99.9%. So the deviation of
house prices from the ‘fundamental value’ is in the range between 10% and 15% once in 10 years.
16For example, see Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Basant Roi and Mendes (2007).
17For example, see Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).
20pectations of households. In the second scenario, “fundamental shocks and over-optimism”,
νA is set to the value speciﬁed above, so that impatient households occasionally become
over-optimistic, causing boom-bust cycles in house prices. In the second scenario, patient
households do not believe public signals and only the impatient households believe them, as
outlined above.
Table 4 indicates that, regardless of the type of loss function, the central bank should
respond less to inﬂation and more to output and should be slower to adjust the policy rate
when over-optimistic expectations of impatient households can occur. The reason for this
result is that since the inﬂation rate is counter-cyclical during boom-bust cycles in house
prices, as shown in Section 5, strong policy reactions to inﬂation would amplify the counter-
cyclicality of the nominal policy interest rate, which would enhance boom-bust cycles in
house prices and destabilize aggregate economic activity.
Comparison between the two types of loss functions under each scenario indicates that
the averseness to ﬂuctuating the policy rate implied by the optimal Taylor rule is not due
to the exogenous cost incorporated by the loss function, but due to the concern that active
policy responses to the inﬂation rate would enhance boom-bust cycles in house prices. This is
an interesting result since estimated Taylor-type monetary policy rules for various countries
imply that adjustments of the nominal policy interest rates are sluggish and an exogenous
cost in the loss function has been necessary to reproduce this observation in the optimal
monetary policy analysis in the literature.
The optimal Taylor rule in Table 4 indicates that the central bank does not have to target
house prices directly to dampen boom-bust cycles. This is because house prices and output
co-move during boom-bust cycles in house prices, as shown in the previous section, so that
responding to output is equivalent to responding to house prices.
Figure 5 compares the impulse responses to a positive public signal of future technological
progress under the baseline Taylor rule in Table 2 and under the optimal Taylor rule in
the “fundamental shocks and over-optimism” scenario. The ﬁgure shows that the optimal
Taylor rule signiﬁcantly dampens endogenous boom-bust cycles in house prices and thus
their destabilizing spillover eﬀects to aggregate economic activity, including inﬂation and
output. The signiﬁcantly dampened boom-bust cycle suggests that monetary policy plays
21an important role in causing boom-bust cycles endogenously in this model.
7 Evaluation of optimal target horizons
In this section, I evaluate optimal target horizons implied by the optimal Taylor rules in
the two scenarios considered above. Optimal target horizons are deﬁned as the expected
numbers of periods which the inﬂation rate takes to return to the target after shocks under
the optimal Taylor rule.18
I adopt the simulation procedure of Basant Roi and Mendes (2007):
· Fundamental shocks and signals are jointly drawn from the probability distributions
at period 0.
· For each draw, compute the impulse response and the number of periods that inﬂa-
tion takes to return to the steady state value. No shocks are drawn after period 0.
The economy is at the deterministic steady state before the realizations of shocks
and signals at date 0.
· I consider ± 0.025% band of the steady state quarterly inﬂation rate as the conver-
gence criterion.
· Iterate the draw by 100,000 times and obtain the distribution of optimal target
horizons.
Table 5 shows the mean as well as the range of optimal target horizons in each scenario
under the optimal Taylor rule shown in Table 4. Table 5 indicates that without the possibility
of endogenous boom-bust cycles in house prices (i.e., “fundamental shocks only”), the average
target horizon is within the horizons adopted by the Bank of Canada (6-8 quarters). With
the possibility of endogenous boom-bust cycles in house prices (i.e., “fundamental shocks
and over-optimism”), optimal target horizons become longer.
While the average target horizon with boom-bust cycles in house prices (17.7 quarters)
might seem to be quite long, note that this is the time that the inﬂation rate takes to return
18This deﬁnition of optimal target horizons is proposed by Batini and Nelson (2000).
22to the very narrow band of the target (within 0.1% error in terms of the annualized inﬂation
rate). If the width of the band is increased to ± 0.3% in terms of the annualized inﬂation
rate, then the average target horizon declines to 7.56 quarters.
The result of longer optimal inﬂation target horizons is similar to Basant Roi and Mendes
(2007). The diﬀerence between this paper and Basant Roi and Mendes is in the reason behind
the result. In Basant Roi and Mendes’ model, exogenous house-price shocks cause persistent
inﬂation dynamics directly. In this paper, the adjustment of the optimal monetary policy rule
to boom-bust cycles in house prices prolongs inﬂation dynamics in response to fundamental
shocks.
8 Sensitivity analysis
This section describes sensitivity analysis. In general, the results reported above are found
to be robust.
8.1 Loss function in optimal monetary policy analysis
I consider the following variations of the loss function:
· E(\ GDPt
2






) + E( ˆ π∗
t
2
) + 0.5 E[(b Rt − b Rt−1)2]
· E(\ GDPt
2
) + 2 E( ˆ π∗
t
2
) + 0.5 E[(b Rt − b Rt−1)2]
· E(\ GDPt
2
) + 0.5 E( ˆ π∗
t
2
) + 0.5 E[(b Rt − b Rt−1)2]
· E(\ GDPt
2
) + E( ˆ π∗
t
2
) + E[(b Rt − b Rt−1)2]
The optimal Taylor rule coeﬃcients reported in Table 4 are not very sensitive to these
variations of the loss function.
8.2 The duration of over-optimism of households
Basant Roi and Mendes (2007) set the average duration of housing booms to 3 years in
their model. In the model in this paper, the duration of housing booms is determined by
the lead time of signals, n. Following Basant Roi and Mendes, I change the value of n
23from 4 quarters to 12 quarters. The optimal Taylor rule is not sensitive to this change,
so that optimal target horizons are not aﬀected, either. The intuition for this insensitivity
is that, since the optimal Taylor rule is set to dampen endogenous boom-bust cycles in
house prices, the persistence of shocks behind boom-bust cycles in house prices (i.e., over-
optimistic expectations of impatient households) does not aﬀect the duration of inﬂation
under the optimal Taylor rule. In contrast, Basant Roi and Mendes report that optimal
target horizons are sensitive to the persistence of exogenous housing booms, since exogenous
shocks to house prices cause persistent inﬂation dynamics in their model.
8.3 The frequency of over-optimism of households
For the value of νA, I consider a smaller value of νA with which the probability that sA,0 > s
is 0.025, where ˆ qt = 0.05 at the peak of the impulse response to sA,0 = s. The optimal Taylor
rule is not sensitive to this change, so that optimal target horizons are not aﬀected much,
either. As explained above, the optimal Taylor rule dampens endogenous boom-bust cycles
in house prices. Thus the frequency of shocks behind boom-bust cycles in house prices does
not much aﬀect optimal target horizons.
8.4 Nominal bonds and expected inﬂation rate in the monetary
policy rule
The baseline model outlined above assume that bonds are indexed and that the nominal
policy interest rate responds to the current inﬂation rate. To conﬁrm the robustness of the
results presented in this paper, this section repeats the main analysis, using a model with
nominal bonds and an expected inﬂation rate in the Taylor rule.
Replace the ﬂow-of-funds constraints for patient and impatient households, Equations


































































b Rt = φR b Rt−1 + φπE
′
t\ dCPIt+1 + φY \ GDPt + ψt. (39)
Assume that the central bank shares expectations with patient households, so that the
central bank forms correct expectations when impatient households have ex-post wrong over-
optimistic expectations, causing boom-bust cycles in house prices. The calibrated parameters
listed in Section 4.8 are re-calibrated with these equations in the same way as the baseline
model.19
It is found that the results of the baseline model are robust to the introduction of nominal
bonds and the expected inﬂation rate in the Taylor rule. Table 6 shows optimal Taylor rules
under the two scenarios considered above, i.e., the case with fundamental shocks and the
case with both fundamental shocks and over-optimism of impatient households. As in the
baseline model, the optimal Taylor rule for the second scenario has less weight on the expected
inﬂation rate and more weight on output and the previous nominal interest rate. Figure 6
compares the impulse responses under the optimal Taylor rule and the baseline Taylor rule,
showing that the optimal Taylor rule signiﬁcantly dampens boom-bust cycles in house prices
by reducing the counter-cyclicality of the nominal policy interest rate.20 Table 7 indicates
that, since the optimal monetary policy rule responds to the inﬂation rate less, the inﬂation
dynamics after fundamental shocks become longer, prolonging the optimal target horizons.
9 Conclusions
This paper evaluates the optimal Taylor-type monetary policy rule with boom-bust cycles
in house prices by using a small open economy model that can replicate the stylized facts of
19(ξ′, ξ′′, ζK, ρYF, σǫYF ) = (28, 1e − 15, 8, 0, 0.09). Other parameter values, including the frequency
of over-optimism in the optimal target horizon analysis, are the same as before.
20Since the nominal policy interest rate responds to the expected inﬂation rate, it rises at the peak of the
housing boom.
25housing-market boom-bust cycles in industrialized countries. The model is also consistent
with suggestive evidence on the relationship between heterogeneous household expectations
and house prices.
The optimal monetary policy analysis in the model indicates that the central bank should
be less responsive to inﬂation, more responsive to output, and slower to adjust the nominal
policy interest rate during boom-bust cycles in house prices. The reason for this result is
that since inﬂation is counter-cyclical during boom-bust cycles in house prices, strong policy
reactions to inﬂation ﬂuctuations would amplify the counter-cyclicality of the nominal policy
interest rate, which would enhance boom-bust cycles in house prices and destabilize aggregate
economic activity. It is found that the weaker optimal monetary policy responses to inﬂation
ﬂuctuations prolong the optimal inﬂation target horizons after fundamental shocks.
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28Table 1: Regressions of the real house price growth rate on the diﬀerence in consumer
expectations between young and old households in Canada
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(Real house price).
Sample period: From 1990:04 To 2007:01.
Regressor Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
EXP(< 45) - EXP(≥ 45) -0.000527∗ (0.000299) -0.000538∗∗ (0.000246) -0.000303 (0.000241)
EXP(< 45) - EXP(≥ 45) (-1) 0.000133 (0.000299) -0.0000144 (0.000252) 0.0000849 (0.000240)
EXP(< 45) - EXP(≥ 45) (-2) 0.000522∗ (0.000299) 0.000614∗∗ (0.000244) 0.000597∗∗ (0.000236)
EXP(< 45) - EXP(≥ 45) (-3) 0.000283 (0.000304) 0.000102 (0.000270) -0.00000616 (0.000259)
Constant -0.00779 (0.0126) 0.00143 (0.0162) -0.00799 (0.0157)
EXP 0.000168 (0.000140)
EXP (-1) 0.000359∗∗ (0.000163)
EXP (-2) -0.000355∗∗ (0.000168)
EXP (-3) -0.0000408 (0.000144)
∆ ln(Real house price) (-1) 0.223∗ (0.131) 0.169 (0.136)
∆ ln(Real house price) (-2) -0.0415 (0.123) 0.0657 (0.134)
∆ ln(Real house price) (-3) 0.0190 (0.122) 0.0679 (0.122)
∆ ln(Real GDP) 1.07∗∗∗ (0.373) 0.821∗∗ (0.378)
∆ ln(Real GDP) (-1) -0.654 (0.472) -0.526 (0.443)
∆ ln(Real GDP) (-2) 0.167 (0.469) 0.140 (0.438)
∆ ln(Real GDP) (-3) 0.0535 (0.401) 0.0333 (0.382)
Real interest rate -0.00407 (0.00318) -0.00212 (0.00302)
Real interest rate (-1) 0.00745∗∗ (0.00316) 0.00916∗∗∗ (0.00303)
Real interest rate (-2) -0.00905∗∗∗ (0.00315) -0.00519 (0.00327)
Real interest rate (-3) -0.00470 (0.00320) -0.00629∗ (0.00330)
R2 0.175 0.636 0.704
Notes: The coeﬃcients are estimated by OLS. The standard errors are in parentheses beside the coeﬃcient
values. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate that the coeﬃcient in question is signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. The minus values in parentheses in the ﬁrst column indicate lagged regressors. ‘EXP (< 45)’
is the index of household expectations for less than 45 years old and ‘EXP (≥ 45)’ for 45 years old and over.
‘EXP’ is the index of household expectations for all ages. The real house price is the Royal LePage House
Price Index denominated by the total CPI. The real GDP and the real interest rate are also denominated by
the total CPI. The real interest rate is the ex-post interest rate. ∆ ln(·) indicates ﬁrst-order log diﬀerence.
29Table 2: Baseline parameter values
(β′,β′′) = (0.99,0.95) Time discount rates
γ = 0.0166 Housing weight in preference
(ξ′,ξ′′) = (19.4, 1e − 14) Elasticity of labour supply
µ = 0.8 Patient’s fraction of population
α = 0.26 Capital share in production
ζK = 19.8 Capital adjustment cost
δ = 0.025 Depreciation rate of capital stock
θ = 6 Elasticity of substitution
ω = 0.3 Import share in ﬁnal domestic demand
m = 0.75 Loan-to-value ratio
χ = 0.5 Probability of price-adjustment
ζB = 1e − 06 Access to international credit markets
τ = 0.8 Elasticity of export demand
λ = 0.218 Weight on the housing-rent components of CPI
κ = 0.292 Elasticity of the housing-rent components of CPI
(φR,φπ,φY ) = (0.733, 0.496, 0.014) Monetary policy rule
(ρA,ρψ,ρrF,ρYF) = (0.93, 0, 0.43, 0) AR(1) coeﬃcients for shocks
(σεA,σεψ,σεrF ,σεYF ) = (0.008, 0.0037, 0.011, 0.11) Standard deviations of shocks
30Table 3: Second moments targeted by calibration of the capital adjustment cost (ζK), the
elasticities of labour supply (ξ′,ξ′′), and the moments of export-demand shocks (ρYF,σYF)
a. Standard deviations of the CPI inﬂation rate and labour supply (relative to de-trended
GDP)
Model Data
CPI inﬂation rate 0.14 0.13
Average hours worked for old households (Age≥45) 0.97 0.69
Average hours worked for young households (Age<45) 1.14 1.25
Aggregate hours worked 0.82 0.91
b. Standard deviation and autocorrelation of detrended GDP
Model Data
Standard deviation 0.05 0.03
Lag-1 autocorrelation 0.94 0.96
31Table 4: Optimal Taylor rules
Loss Scenario Taylor rule coeﬃcients
function b π∗
t \ GDPt ˆ Rt−1 ˆ qt
z = 0.5 fundamental shocks only 0.96 0 0.2 0
z = 0.5 fundamental shocks and over-optimism 0.3 0.06 0.9 0
z = 0 fundamental shocks only 1.2 0 0 0
z = 0 fundamental shocks and over-optimism 0.3 0.06 0.9 0
Notes: The optimal coeﬃcients of the Taylor rule are found by grid search. The intervals of the
grid points are 0.02 for φY , 0.1 for φR, 0.1 for φq and 0.2(1-φR) for φπ.
Table 5: Optimal target horizons (OTHs)
Scenario Mean of OTHs 99 percentile of OTHs
fundamental shocks only 5.06 16
fundamental shocks and over-optimism 17.74 37
Notes: The optimal monetary policy rule for each scenario is in Table 4 (z = 0.5).
32Table 6: Optimal Taylor rules: with nominal bonds and an expected inﬂation rate in the
Taylor rule
Loss Scenario Taylor rule coeﬃcients
function b π∗
t \ GDPt ˆ Rt−1 ˆ qt
z = 0.5 fundamental shocks only 1.28 0 0.2 0
z = 0.5 fundamental shocks and over-optimism 0.8 0.1 0.8 0
z = 0 fundamental shocks only 1.6 0 0 0
z = 0 fundamental shocks and over-optimism 0.8 0.1 0.8 0
Notes: The optimal coeﬃcients of the Taylor rule are found by grid search. The intervals of the
grid points are 0.02 for φY , 0.1 for φR, 0.1 for φq and 0.2(1-φR) for φπ.
Table 7: Optimal target horizons (OTHs): with nominal bonds and an expected inﬂation
rate in the Taylor rule
Scenario Mean of OTHs 99 percentile of OTHs
fundamental shocks only 4.26 7
fundamental shocks and over-optimism 14.57 33
Notes: The optimal monetary policy rule for each scenario is in Table 6 (z = 0.5).
33Figure 1: Median dynamics around the peaks of housing-market boom-bust cycles in indus-
trialized countries
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Notes: The solid line is the median of the variable in question in each quarter around the peaks of past
housing booms in industrialized countries for 1973 to 2000. The dashed lines below and above the solid
line are the ﬁrst and the third quartiles in each quarter, respectively. Period 0 corresponds to the peaks of
housing booms.
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35Figure 3: Real house price growth rates and diﬀerences in the Index of Consumer Expecta-











































Index of Consumer Expectations: Difference between young and old (left axis)
Real house price growth rate (right axis)
Notes: Positive values of “Diﬀerence between young and old” in the ﬁgure indicate that young households
(44 years old or less) have stronger expectations for future economic conditions than old households (45
years old or more).
36Figure 4: Response to over-optimism of impatient households
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Notes: Figures are % deviations from the deterministic steady-state values except bF,t, which is a diﬀerence
from the steady-state value. The signal is received in period 0, but is not realized in period 4, i.e. sA,0 = σεA
and εA,4 = 0. The economy is at the steady state before period 0. Only the impatient households expect
the gain, i.e. ν′
A = ∞ and ν′′
A = 0. In the ﬁrst and second rows, C and L are aggregate consumption and
labour supply, respectively. “House Pr.” is the house price, qt, “CPI” is the CPI inﬂation rate, dCPIt, “Π
(goods)” is the inﬂation rate of ﬁnal goods, Πt, “Real FX” is the real exchange rate, st, and “Mgnl. cost”
is the marginal cost of production, ft. The third and the forth rows respectively show the actions of the
patient and the impatient households.
37Figure 5: Responses to over-optimism of impatient households under the baseline Taylor
rule and the optimal Taylor rule




       b"     





−3        b
F    





−4        R      





−4    c’   





−4    L’    





−3    h’ 





−3          c"      





−3          L"      




         h"      





−4     i’     





−4       π (goods)





−4         House Pr.





−3        Mgnl. cost





−3           L      





−4           C      





−4        Real FX   





−4         GDP      










Notes: The solid line: the baseline Taylor rule in Table 2. The dashed line: the optimal Taylor rule in
the ‘fundamental shocks and over-optimism’ scenario shown in Table 4. Figures are % deviations from the
deterministic steady-state values except bF,t, which is a diﬀerence from the steady-state value. The signal
is received in period 0, but is not realized in period 4, i.e. sA,0 = σεA and εA,4 = 0. The economy is at
the steady state before period 0. Only the impatient households expect the gain, i.e. ν′
A = ∞ and ν′′
A = 0.
In the ﬁrst and second rows, C and L are aggregate consumption and labour supply, respectively. “House
Pr.” is the house price, qt, “CPI” is the CPI inﬂation rate, dCPIt, “Π (goods)” is the inﬂation rate of ﬁnal
goods, Πt, “Real FX” is the real exchange rate, st, and “Mgnl. cost” is the marginal cost of production, ft.
The third and the forth rows respectively show the actions of the patient and the impatient households.
38Figure 6: Responses to over-optimism of impatient households under the baseline Taylor
rule and the optimal Taylor rule: with nominal bonds and the expected inﬂation rate in the
Taylor rule




       b"     





−3        b
F    





−5        R      





−5     c’





−5     L’





−3     h’    





−4          c"      





−3          L"      




         h"      





−4     i’     





−4       π (goods)





−5         House Pr.





−4        Mgnl. cost





−4           L      





−5           C      





−5        Real FX   





−4         GDP      










Notes: The solid line: the baseline Taylor rule in Table 2. The dashed line: the optimal Taylor rule in
the ‘fundamental shocks and over-optimism’ scenario shown in Table 6. Figures are % deviations from the
deterministic steady-state values except bF,t, which is a diﬀerence from the steady-state value. The signal
is received in period 0, but is not realized in period 4, i.e. sA,0 = σεA and εA,4 = 0. The economy is at
the steady state before period 0. Only the impatient households expect the gain, i.e. ν′
A = ∞ and ν′′
A = 0.
In the ﬁrst and second rows, C and L are aggregate consumption and labour supply, respectively. “House
Pr.” is the house price, qt, “CPI” is the CPI inﬂation rate, dCPIt, “Π (goods)” is the inﬂation rate of ﬁnal
goods, Πt, “Real FX” is the real exchange rate, st, and “Mgnl. cost” is the marginal cost of production, ft.
The third and the forth rows respectively show the actions of the patient and the impatient households.
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